Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin proposes fix for high gas fees


Crypto billionaire Vitalik Buterin has suggested a new short-term solution to curb soaring gas prices on the Ethereum network. The solution involves a new network upgrade that reduces the transaction calldata cost as well as limits the total transaction call data in a single block. 

Surging gas fee prices on Ethereum have constantly plagued the network where investors have been paying a very high transactional gas fee to execute a crypto transaction on the network. The explosive surge in gas fee prices has prompted many users to migrate to other cost-effective blockchain networks and has compelled many investors to ditch the network indefinitely. 

A quick fix that limits high gas fee prices

In a bid to control the increased gas fee prices on the network, Buterin has suggested a short-term network upgrade EIP-4488 that intends to restrict the soaring gas fee prices. 

As per the information posted on the Ethereum Magicians forum, Buterin has laid out a plan that includes a quick fix solution that ensures that the explosive gas prices can be curbed for the time being by reducing the transaction calldata cost and restricting total transaction calldata in a single block. 

“Simply decreasing the calldata gas cost from 16 to 3 would increase the maximum block size to 10M bytes. This would push the Ethereum p2p [peer-to-peer] networking layer to unprecedented levels of strain and risk breaking the network; some previous live tests of ~500 kB blocks a few years ago had already taken down a few bootstrap nodes,” Buterin added

Moreover, the new EIP-4488 network upgrade will also help reduce the growing stress on the network by adding more security and protecting the network from reaching its alleged “breaking point.” The proposal, once approved, will allow miners to pause a transaction while they are being added to the block as soon as the calldata strikes its limit. 

The new network upgrade invites criticisms

The new solution suggested by Buterin that seeks to stabilize the explosive gas fee prices on the network has drawn criticism from Ethereum devs. 

The devs further explained that the new network upgrade may cause rollup transactions to drop, leading the users to pay an even higher total fee to reimburse for the lack of execution gas on transactions. 

“The additional constraint might require them to pay an even higher fee to outbid other rollups competing on the same calldata space,” the dev further added

Ethereum gas fee prices have been a source of constant distress for many investors who regularly use the network to conduct crypto transactions.


CryptoSlate Newsletter

Featuring a summary of the most important daily stories in the world of crypto, DeFi, NFTs and more.

Get an edge on the cryptoasset market

Access more crypto insights and context in every article as a paid member of CryptoSlate Edge.

On-chain analysis

Price snapshots

More context

Join now for $19/month Explore all benefits

Posted In: Ethereum, Technology

Source link

yeah of course

yeah of coursesubmitted by /u/Paul297 [comments]

from Ethereum

Source link

Avalanche Gets Into Top 10 As ETH Users Complain On Gas Fees

Avalanche gets into the top 10 as more users are looking for faster and cheaper blockchain alternatives to Ethereum and complain about the ETH gas fees so let’s read more in our latest cryptocurrency news today.

Avalanche gets into the top 10 cryptocurrencies by market cap and now the currency hit an all-time high after a tweet by the investor Zhu Su criticized gas fees on ETH. The fees are nominal compared to Ethereum but also the transacting is much faster. Avalanche is a high-speed and low-cost blockchain that wants to take on Ethereum made its way into the top ten coins by market cap. The coin is now worth $134 with a market cap of $30.19 billion and set its all-time high earlier today when it reached $146.22.

Avalanche increased to the top 10 positions eight hours after the CEO of Singaporean Crypto hedge fund Three Arrows Capital posted that he abandoned Ethereum despite supporting it in the past and Three Arrows invested heavily in Avalanche similarly to how Sino Global Capital and Sam Baknman Fried invested in Solana as the other Ethereum rival. Together with Polychain Capital, Three Arrows led a $230 million funding round back in September exactly in Avalanche. He tweeted:

“Ethereum has abandoned its users despite supporting them in the past. The idea of sitting around jerking off watching the burn and concocting purity tests, while zero newcomers can afford the chain, is gross. Users are livid that they’re promised a vision of the future, then told that they have to pay $100-1k per tx to enjoy it, and then get told some tales about how they should’ve been smart enough to buy ETH at $10.”

crypto market
Cryptocurrency Market Overview. Source Quantify Crypto

Zhu put his money where his mouth is when the company moved above $78 million ETH to crypto exchange FTX and more people started moving funds to exchanges in order to sell them. While it did cost up to $100 and took a few minutes to swap a coin on Uniswap, the transaction fees on Avalanche cost under a dollar, and the settlement is fast. To do this, Avalanche splits the work across three blockchains known as P, C, and X. Avalanche’s C-chain supports smart contracts just like Ethereum and Defi protocols now handle about $12.5 million, and Ethereum’s DeFi protocols manage $174 billion. While Avalanche has a new way to go before it topples Ethereum, it has a market cap of $515 billion and it is well on its way.

DC Forecasts is a leader in many crypto news categories, striving for the highest journalistic standards and abiding by a strict set of editorial policies. If you are interested to offer your expertise or contribute to our news website, feel free to contact us at [email protected]

Source link

FAQ EIP 1559 | Ethereum France

FAQ publiée par Vitalik Buterin sur, traduite par Jean Zundel.

Bien sûr, le lancement réussi d’Eth2 a occupé tous les esprits ces dernières semaines, mais les travaux se poursuivent sur tous les fronts. L’EIP 1559, en discussion depuis plusieurs mois, représente une évolution majeure en changeant fondamentalement le fonctionnement des fees, les frais de transaction.

Qu’est-ce que l’EIP 1559 ?

L’EIP 1559 est une proposition visant à réformer le marché des frais d’Ethereum, avec les changements clés suivants :

  • La limite actuelle de 10 millions de gaz est remplacée par deux valeurs : un «objectif moyen à long terme» (10 millions), et un «plafond ferme par bloc» (20 millions) ;
  • Il existe un BASEFEE (qui est brûlé) que les transactions doivent payer, qui est ajusté bloc par bloc dans le but de cibler une valeur telle que la consommation moyenne de gaz du bloc reste autour de 10 millions.

En substance, alors que toute la volatilité à court terme de la demande d’espace de transaction à l’intérieur d’un bloc se traduit actuellement par une volatilité des frais de transaction, une partie se traduirait alors par une volatilité de la taille des blocs.

En quoi l’EIP 1559 est-elle bénéfique ?

Pour citer un ancien article :

Le statu quo des marchés des frais de transaction pose trois problèmes majeurs :

  • Inadéquation entre volatilité des niveaux de frais de transaction et coût social des transactions : les frais de transaction sur les chaînes de blocs publiques établies, dont l’utilisation est suffisante pour que les blocs soient pleins, tendent à être extrêmement volatils. Sur Ethereum, les frais minimums tournent généralement autour de 2 gwei (109 gwei = 1 ETH), mais ils peuvent parfois monter jusqu’à 20 à 50 gwei, voire 200 gwei en une occasion : Il est clair que cela engendre une certaine inefficacité car il est absurde de supposer que le coût supporté par le réseau pour accepter une transaction supplémentaire dans un bloc soit 100 fois plus élevé lorsque le prix du gaz est de 200 gwei que lorsqu’il est de 2 gwei ; dans les deux cas, il s’agit d’une différence entre 8 millions de gaz et 8,02 millions de gaz ;
  • Inefficacités des enchères de premier prix : voir pour un compte rendu détaillé. En bref, dans l’approche actuelle, les émetteurs publient une transaction avec une redevance, les mineurs choisissent les transactions les plus rémunératrices et chacun paie ce qu’il offre. Cette approche est bien connue dans la littérature sur les mécanismes d’incitation pour être très inefficace, nécessitant des algorithmes complexes d’estimation des frais ; ces algorithmes finissent souvent par ne pas très bien fonctionner, ce qui entraîne fréquemment des frais excessifs. Voir également, la description par un core développeur Bitcoin des défis entraînés par le statu quo de l’estimation des frais ;
  • Instabilité des chaînes de blocs sans récompense en bloc : à long terme, les chaînes de blocs où il n’y aura pas d’émission (y compris Bitcoin et Zcash) ont actuellement l’intention de récompenser les mineurs par les frais des transactions. Toutefois, des résultats connus montrent que cela risque d’entraîner une grande instabilité, en incitant à miner des «blocs frères» pour voler les frais de transaction, ouvrant ainsi des vecteurs d’attaque par minage égoïste beaucoup plus puissants, etc. Il n’existe actuellement aucune mesure efficace d’atténuation de ce phénomène.

L’EIP 1559 présente ces avantages :

  • Il atténue les inefficacités économiques dues à l’inadéquation des coûts sociaux en raison de la volatilité des frais. L’argument économique est assez nuancé ; voir en particulier les pages 16 à 20 du document dont le lien figure sur (bien que je recommande de lire l’ensemble du document) pour une argumentation détaillée sur les raisons de cette situation. Intuitivement, le mécanisme d’ajustement des frais fonctionne comme un frais fixe à court terme et un plafond à long terme, et il s’avère qu’en raison des arguments avancés dans cet l’article de Martin Weitzman (en 1974), des frais fixes sont probablement préférables à un plafond dans les conditions où, fondamentalement, toutes les blockchains publiques sont aujourd’hui en place.
  • Il remplace la vente aux enchères par une vente à prix fixe (sauf pendant de courtes périodes où les blocs se remplissent complètement jusqu’à ce que les frais rattrapent leur retard), ce qui élimine les inefficacités de la vente aux enchères au premier prix et rend l’estimation des frais extrêmement simple : calculez les frais f pour le bloc suivant, si vous pouvez vous le permettre, payez-les, sinon ne le faites pas.
  • Il crée un mécanisme similaire à une récompense permanente par bloc (le 1/N provenant du pot), ce qui atténue bon nombre des problèmes d’instabilité liés aux chaînes de blocs fonctionnant uniquement sur les frais sans nécessiter de véritable émission permanente.

Un autre avantage sous-estimé de l’EIP 1559 est qu’il permet de mesurer les prix du gaz de manière sûre. Aujourd’hui, le simple fait de regarder les prix du gaz sur la chaîne et de les utiliser comme indice est exploitable, car les mineurs peuvent inclure des transactions fictives à très faible ou très forte redevance, où la redevance se ferait à eux-mêmes. Mais en vertu de l’EIP 1559, le BASEFEE ne peut être manipulé qu’à un coût élevé, car les transactions fictives exigeraient même du mineur qu’il paie des frais (qui sont brûlés).

Les marchés actuels des frais sont-ils vraiment si inefficaces ?

Oui, la différence entre le prix moyen du gaz et le dixième centile du prix du gaz dans un bloc normal est d’environ 3 fois pour la médiane et de 5 à 8 fois pour la moyenne. Les gens paient trop, en masse, inutilement.

Toute personne qui ne paie pas trop subit un retard de 1 à 2 minutes, voire plus, et ce retard ne profite en fait à personne ; la charge totale de la chaîne est la même, qu’une unité de charge donnée atteigne la chaîne au temps N ou au temps N + 60. Il n’y a aucun avantage social réel à favoriser des participants «exprimant une préférence pour la rapidité» dans le mécanisme du marché des frais, du moins dans des conditions normales ; il s’agit d’une perte parfaitement inutile. Il vaudrait mieux pour nous tous que davantage de transactions soient incluses immédiatement, ce que permet l’EIP 1559.

Pourquoi ne pas simplement utiliser la deuxième enchère (ou une k-ième enchère) pour résoudre les inefficacités de la meilleure enchère ?

Les enchères au k-ième prix (où chacun paie un prix de gaz égal au prix le plus bas qui était inclus dans le bloc) sont effectivement «efficaces» dans une analyse économique traditionnelle*, mais elles ont le défaut d’être vulnérables à la collusion.

* Oui, bien sûr, techniquement, il faut utiliser le prix du gaz le plus élevé qui n’est pas inclus dans le bloc ; mais en pratique, étant donné que la plupart des blocs Ethereum comportent des centaines de transactions, la différence serait négligeable.

L’EIP 1559 pourrait-elle faire courir le risque de surcharger les nœuds et les mineurs pendant les périodes de forte utilisation ?

EIP 1559 peut tout au plus multiplier par 2 la taille des blocs, même à court terme. Chaque «bloc complet» (c’est-à-dire un bloc dont le gaz est 2x la TARGET) augmente le BASEFEE de 1,125x, donc une série de blocs complets constants augmentera le prix du gaz par un facteur 10 tous les ~20 blocs (~4,3 min en moyenne). Par conséquent, les périodes de forte charge sur la chaîne ne dureront pas plus de 5 minutes.

Notez qu’actuellement, les périodes de doublement de la charge durant 5 minutes se produisent déjà aléatoirement environ une fois tous les ~63888 blocs (~10 jours) en raison de la variance du taux de production des blocs. L’introduction de l’EIP 1559 n’entraînerait donc pas un niveau de charge sans précédent dans le système.

En outre, la limite de gaz de 10 millions, pas plus, est justifiée dans une large mesure non par des limites strictes du réseau (les taux d’oncles sont proches des plus bas niveaux historiques, bien que les risques pour les nœuds non-mineurs tels que les nœuds de bootstrap puissent être plus élevés), mais par des préoccupations fondamentalement long terme :

  • Risque de centralisation par des taux d’oncles un peu plus élevés : si les taux d’oncles grimpaient jusqu’à 20%, cela profiterait de manière disproportionnée aux grands bassins bien connectés ;
  • Limites en taille de l’état ;
  • Difficulté de synchronisation après une courte période hors ligne.

Dans ces trois cas, ce qui importe n’est pas la limite supérieure de la capacité dans une fenêtre de temps très courte, mais plutôt la capacité moyenne à long terme. Le fait que les taux d’oncles soient de 2% pendant les heures impaires et de 18% pendant les heures paires aurait le même effet sur les trois cas précités, car les taux d’oncle sont toujours de 10%. Étant donné que l’EIP 1559 limite toujours la consommation de gaz à long terme à une moyenne d’environ 10 millions par bloc, il n’affecte pas la moyenne à long terme.

À quoi ressemblerait un pic de consommation élevée avec l’EIP 1559 par rapport au statu quo ?

Considérons un «pic mathématiquement idéal» (par exemple, cela pourrait se produire dans la vie réelle en raison d’un événement soudain sur le marché conduisant à de nombreuses possibilités d’arbitrage sur les DEX, à des offres sur les CDP liquidés, etc.), où N * 10 millions de transactions de gaz, chacune avec un prix du gaz très très élevé, sont toutes diffusées.

Actuellement, cela conduirait à la situation suivante :

  • Les prochains blocs N seraient exclusivement remplis de nouvelles transactions à prix élevés ;
  • Ensuite, les autres transactions, ainsi que celles que les gens enverraient après le pic, seraient incluses dans l’ordre décroissant du prix du gaz.

Un «utilisateur normal» moyen devrait attendre plus de N blocs.

Examinons maintenant la situation avec l’EIP 1559 :

  • Les blocs N/2 suivants seraient remplis exclusivement de nouvelles transactions «d’heure de pointe», chacune avec une quantité de gaz deux fois plus importante que la normale ;
  • Si toutes les autres transactions sont envoyées avec un plafond de prix du gaz égal à l’ancien prix du gaz, les blocs N/2 suivants seraient vides, et après cela les choses reviendraient à la normale. Mais de manière réaliste, les transactions prioritaires fixeraient des plafonds de prix du gaz plus élevés et seraient incluses en premier, et les autres transactions plus tard.

Un «utilisateur normal» moyen devrait attendre quelque part entre N/2 et plus de N blocs.

Par conséquent, même en incluant la «période de récupération» après la période de pointe pendant laquelle la capacité des blocs serait inférieure à la normale, la plupart des transactions seraient incluses plus tôt.

Voici une simulation très grossière (il y a beaucoup d’hypothèses étranges ici, mais il est difficile de modéliser un système complet qui couvre à la fois les courbes de l’offre et de la demande et les temps d’attente) ; le tableau source est ici.

Statu quo :

EIP 1559 :

Que ferait l’EIP 1559 en cas de pics plus importants et plus prolongés (p. ex. pics d’une journée) ?

Pas beaucoup. Le BASEFEE augmenterait et il y aurait une courte période au début où quelques transactions seraient plus rapides, mais après cela, le marché des frais fonctionnerait comme dans des conditions «ordinaires», à un niveau de frais plus élevé. Le principal avantage de l’EIP 1559 en matière de pics est que les dommages causés par l’inefficacité des marchés de frais ordinaires sont amplifiés lorsque les frais sont élevés, de sorte qu’il devient plus important d’avoir un marché des frais qui fonctionne.

Pourquoi limit = cible * 2 ? Pourquoi pas 4 ? Ou 8 ?

Plus le rapport limite / cible est élevé, plus les avantages de l’EIP 1559 en termes d’efficacité du marché des frais sont importants. Cela dépend de l’amplitude des pics à court terme que nous sommes prêts à accepter ; 2x est assez prudent. Nous pourrions même lancer l’EIP 1559 avec un rapport limite / objectif de 2 pour commencer, et l’augmenter au fil du temps si nous voyons que le réseau fonctionne bien même en cas de pics à court terme.

Pourquoi les mineurs incluraient-ils des transactions ?

L’EIP comprend un «pourboire» que les émetteurs de transactions peuvent inclure pour le mineur. Ce pourboire sert à deux choses : premièrement, s’il y a subitement beaucoup plus de transactions que prévu, les mineurs incluront d’abord les transactions avec un pourboire plus élevé, de sorte que le mécanisme de priorisation basé sur les frais reste finalement actif. Deuxièmement, il compense le risque d’oncles pour les mineurs (le risque accru que leur bloc ne soit pas inclus dans la chaîne principale parce que l’ajout d’une transaction supplémentaire le ralentira).

Le calcul du niveau de pourboire qui compense le risque d’oncle donne environ 0,8 gwei (les blocs oncles obtiennent en moyenne une récompense de 1,67 ETH au lieu de la base de 2 ETH, ce qui représente une perte de ~0,33 ETH = 330m gwei, 10 millions de blocs de gaz ajoutent ~0,025 au taux d’oncles par rapport aux blocs vides, donc le coût prévu du gaz est = 330m / 10m * 0,025 = 0,825 gwei) et les mineurs se fixent effectivement cette valeur lorsque la chaîne est vide.

Ce niveau de pourboire est indépendant du BASEFEE, de sorte que les clients peuvent en toute confiance fixer 1-1,5 gwei et s’attendre à ce que leurs transactions soient acceptées.

Comment les portefeuilles peuvent-ils choisir les pourboires ? Y a-t-il un risque de guerre des enchères pour les pourboires ?

Les portefeuilles pourront simplement choisir les pourboires en examinant quels pourboires ont été acceptés dans le passé sur la chaîne et en augmentant leur pourboire s’ils constatent qu’une transaction qu’ils envoient n’a pas été acceptée immédiatement. Notez que dans des «conditions normales», il n’y a aucune raison de fixer un pourboire supérieur au strict minimum.

En cas de congestion soudaine, les pourboires se transforment en guerre d’enchères ; les portefeuilles peuvent détecter la congestion et, dans ce cas, ils peuvent offrir aux utilisateurs la possibilité de fixer une priorité faible ou élevée pour leur transaction.

Qu’est-ce que le mécanisme d’escalator ? Comment peut-il être combiné avec le PEI 1559 ?

Le mécanisme d’escalator est une proposition de réforme différente des frais de transaction dans laquelle, au lieu de spécifier des frais uniques, les utilisateurs spécifient leurs frais comme une fonction, généralement avec un début, une augmentation par bloc et un maximum, par exemple «5 gwei si cette transaction est incluse dans le bloc 10123456, ajouter 1 gwei pour chaque bloc suivant (par exemple 8 gwei si inclus dans le bloc 10123459), jusqu’à un maximum de 100 gwei».

Il s’agirait de quatre paramètres : frais de début, bloc de début, incrément par bloc, frais maximum.

L’objectif est d’être «plus sécurisé» envers les erreurs d’estimation des frais, car si les frais s’avèrent trop bas, ils augmenteront naturellement au fil du temps jusqu’à ce que la transaction soit incluse. Dans le contexte de l’EIP 1559, cela pourrait être utilisé pour fixer le pourboire. Le fait que le pourboire se situerait généralement dans une fourchette constante signifie que même un portefeuille n’utilisant que des paramètres fixes pour l’escalator donnerait des résultats assez corrects aux utilisateurs.

Les mineurs ne seront-ils pas incités à s’associer pour faire baisser le BASEFEE en limitant le remplissage de leurs blocs à moins de la moitié ?

En général, l’efficacité ce genre de stratégies est limitée, car à moins que presque tout le monde ne soit de connivence, une transaction non incluse dans un bloc sera incluse dans le bloc suivant ; l’effet de cette action sur le BASEFEE à long terme sera donc négligeable.

Toutefois, les mineurs peuvent mettre en place une sorte de «tarification monopolistique». Supposons que les émetteurs de transactions soient prêts à payer des frais supplémentaires pour éviter d’être retardés d’un bloc. Les mineurs peuvent refuser d’inclure les transactions qui ne comportent pas un pourboire minimum T ; ils perdent une partie de leurs revenus, mais gagnent à ce que les émetteurs augmentent leurs frais s’ils évaluent la probabilité supplémentaire que vous soyez le prochain mineur et qu’ils incluent leur transaction de manière suffisamment élevée. Cette stratégie est fortement défavorable au mineur : il subit le coût total de la perte de revenus, mais ne gagne qu’une petite partie de l’augmentation des frais de transaction que d’autres envoient.

Notez que même si un mineur réussit avec cette stratégie, il augmentera les revenus des autres mineurs plus qu’il n’augmentera ses propres revenus (car les autres mineurs profitent des pourboires plus élevés en raison de vos actions), et il ne s’agit donc pas d’un vecteur de centralisation.

Cela ne ramènera pas le BASEFEE à zéro, mais permettra d’atteindre un équilibre où le BASEFEE constituera toujours la majeure partie des frais et les pourboires le complétant. En effet, à moins que les mineurs ne soient tous de connivence (auquel cas nous avons des problèmes plus importants), les mineurs subissent la totalité des coûts, hors transactions, mais ne bénéficient que partiellement des avantages liés à l’augmentation des pourboires.

Si le risque que les mineurs déploient une telle stratégie reste inacceptable, nous pouvons affecter une partie (par exemple 50%) des recettes de l’EIP 1559 à un fonds commun dont un petit pourcentage est prélevé sur chaque bloc pour être ajouté à la récompense de bloc des mineurs ; cela garantit que les mineurs bénéficient d’un BASEFEE élevé, ce qui réduit encore les gains d’une telle attaque.

Voici, schématisée, une proposition de modification de l’EIP allant dans ce sens :

  • Définir le compte 0x35 comme FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER, et définir FEE_SMOOTHING_CONSTANT = 8192 ;
  • Ajouter un terme supplémentaire à la récompense en bloc (ajouté en même temps que la récompense en bloc de base et les récompenses oncle+neveu). Soit smoothing_reward = FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER.balance // FEE_SMOOTHING_CONSTANT. Transférer smoothing_reward wei de FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER vers block.coinbase ;
  • Après l’application des récompenses du bloc, la moitié des frais EIP-1559 de ce bloc (arrondis à l’inférieur) est ajoutée au solde de FEE_SMOOTHING_BUFFER. Le reste (c’est-à-dire la moitié arrondie à l’unité supérieure) est brûlé.

Notez que dans un contexte de preuve d’enjeu, il serait souhaitable de mettre en place des élections à bulletins secrets des dirigeants ainsi que des sanctions en cas de révélation prématurée, afin d’empêcher les validateurs d’acquérir la réputation de n’accepter que des pourboires élevés et d’en tirer eux-mêmes tout le bénéfice, car les émetteurs de transactions sauraient quels validateurs vont bientôt créer des blocs.

Autres ressources

Le document original :

Thread de sur les simulations de Barnabe :

Source link

EEA Member Spotlight with Tetsushi Hisata, Founder and CEO of Datachain

As an EEA member, Datachain is part of the EEA community of organizations working to advance Ethereum and drive industry adoption. In the Q&A below, the EEA interviewed Founder and CEO Tetsushi Hisata about how Datachain is contributing to the ecosystem to help Ethereum reach its full potential.

Please introduce your company and yourself briefly.

I am the Founder and CEO of Datachain, a startup working to solve blockchain interoperability challenges. Datachain decided to join EEA because we want to learn and engage with the community around interoperable technology. We are excited to join the EEA’s Cross Chain Interoperability Working Group to learn more and discuss how interoperability can be advanced.

Get the Latest EEA Updates

Datachain has been working on an interoperability effort called YUI. “YUI” is the Japanese word meaning to knot, join and connect, and the YUI project is a Hyperledger lab to achieve interoperability between multiple heterogeneous ledgers. The YUI project provides modules, applications, and middleware for cross-chain communication and development, including an explorer to track status and events for cross-chain environments. Since YUI supports both Enterprise Ethereum (e.g. Hyperledger Besu) and Public Ethereum, it can connect the Ethereum blockchain with other blockchains to expand the possibilities.

How will end-users benefit from your Ethereum interoperability work?

Among the modules of the YUI project, which applies Cosmos’ IBC Protocol to the enterprise space to enable interoperability between various blockchain platforms without relying on third-party trust, we are focusing on implementing IBC-Solidity, a Solidity implementation of IBC (Inter-Blockchain Communication), with a grant from the Interchain Foundation. With the implementation of IBC-Solidity, the Ethereum blockchain will interoperate with other blockchain infrastructures using IBC. We are also working on the Cross Framework, which enables Cross-Chain transactions between different blockchains.

How will the EEA enhance your organization’s current efforts?

By participating in the EEA’s Cross Chain Interoperability Working Group and connecting with EEA community members, we would like to consider the commercialization of Datachain technology in specific projects. In Japan, we have been working with a number of companies such as NTT Data and Hitachi on interoperability, and the EEA will help us expand our efforts globally.

What about the EEA are you most excited about?

The Ethereum blockchain, both enterprise and public, is being used in various projects worldwide, and we believe that new value will be created when such projects connect with projects built on other blockchain platforms.

Learn More and Connect with the EEA

The EEA enables organizations to adopt and use Ethereum technology in their daily business operations. We empower the Ethereum ecosystem to develop new business opportunities, drive industry adoption, and learn and collaborate. Join us and contribute to our work!

Learn more about EEA membership, sign up for the latest updates, and contact [email protected].

Source link

How The Merge Impacts Ethereum’s Application Layer

Ethereum’s transition to proof of stake – The Merge – is near: devnets are being stood up, specifications are being finalized and community outreach has begun in earnest. The Merge is designed to have minimal impact on how Ethereum operates for end users, smart contracts and dapps. That said, there are some minor changes worth highlighting. Before we dive into them, here are a few links to provide context about the overall Merge architecture:

The rest of this post will assume the reader is familiar with the above. For those wanting to dig even deeper, the full specifications for The Merge are available here:

Block structure

After The Merge, proof of work blocks will no longer exist on the network. Instead, the former contents of proof of work becomes a component of blocks created on the Beacon Chain. You can then think of the Beacon Chain as becoming the new proof of stake consensus layer of Ethereum, superseding the previous proof of work consensus layer. Beacon chain blocks will contain ExecutionPayloads, which are the post-merge equivalent of blocks on the current proof of work chain. The image below shows this relationship:

For end users and application developers, these ExecutionPayloads are where interactions with Ethereum happen. Transactions on this layer will still be processed by execution layer clients (Besu, Erigon, Geth, Nethermind, etc.). Fortunately, due to the stability of the execution layer, The Merge introduces only minimal breaking changes.

Mining & Ommer Block Fields

Post-merge, several fields previously contained in proof of work block headers become unused as they are irrelevant to proof of stake. In order to minimize disruption to tooling and infrastructure, these fields are set to 0, or their data structure’s equivalent, rather than being entirely removed from the data structure. The full changes to block fields can be found in EIP-3675.

FieldConstant valueComment
ommers[]RLP([]) = 0xc0
ommersHash0x1dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d49347= Keccak256(RLP([]))

Because proof of stake does not naturally produce ommers (a.k.a. uncle blocks) like proof of work, the list of these in each block (ommers) will be empty, and the hash of this list (ommersHash) will become the RLP-encoded hash of an empty list. Similarly, because difficulty and nonce are features of proof of work, these will be set to 0, while respecting their byte-size values.

mixHash, another mining-related field, won’t be set to 0 but will instead contain the beacon chain’s RANDAO value. More on this below.

BLOCKHASH & DIFFICULTY opcodes changes

Post-merge, the BLOCKHASH opcode will still be available for use, but given that it will no longer be forged through the proof of work hashing process, the pseudorandomness provided by this opcode will be much weaker.

Relatedly, the DIFFICULTY opcode (0x44) will be updated and renamed to RANDOM. Post-merge, it will return the output of the randomness beacon provided by the beacon chain. This opcode will thus be a stronger, albeit still biasable, source of randomness for application developers to use than BLOCKHASH.

The value exposed by RANDOM will be stored in the ExecutionPayload where mixHash, a value associated with proof of work computation, was stored. The payload’s mixHash field will also be renamed random.

Here is an illustration of how the DIFFICULTY & RANDOM opcodes work pre and post-merge:

Pre-merge, we see the 0x44 opcode returns the difficulty field in the block header. Post-merge, the opcode, renamed to RANDOM, points to the header field which previously contained mixHash and now stores the random value from the beacon chain state.

This change, formalized in EIP-4399, also provides on-chain applications a way to assess whether The Merge has happened. From the EIP:

Additionally, changes proposed by this EIP allow for smart contracts to determine whether the upgrade to the PoS has already happened. This can be done by analyzing the return value of the DIFFICULTY opcode. A value greater than 2**64 indicates that the transaction is being executed in the PoS block.

Block time

The Merge will impact the average block time on Ethereum. Currently under proof of work, blocks come in on average every ~13 seconds with a fair amount of variance in actual block times. Under proof of stake, blocks come in exactly each 12 seconds except when a slot is missed either because a validator is offline or because they do not submit a block in time. In practice, this currently happens in <1% of slots.

This implies a ~1 second reduction of average block times on the network. Smart contracts which assume a particular average block time in their calculations will need to take this into account.

Safe Head & Finalized Blocks

Under proof of work there is always the potential for reorgs. Applications usually wait for several blocks to be mined on top of a new head before treating it as unlikely to be removed from the canonical chain, or “confirmed”. After The Merge, we instead have the concepts of finalized and safe head blocks. These blocks can be used even more reliably than the “confirmed” proof of work blocks but require a shift in understanding to use correctly.

A finalized block is one which has been accepted as canonical by >2/3 of validators. To create a conflicting block, an attacker would have to burn at least 1/3 of the total stake. At the time of this writing, this represents over $10 billion (or >2.5 million ETH) on Ethereum.

A safe head block is one which, under normal network conditions, we expect to be included in the canonical chain. Assuming network delays of less than 4 seconds, an honest majority of validators and no attacks on the fork-choice rule, the safe head will never be orphaned. A presentation detailing how the safe head is calculated under various scenarios is available here. Additionally, the assumptions and guarantees of safe head are being formally defined and analysed in an upcoming paper.

Post-merge, execution layer APIs (e.g. JSON RPC) will return the safe head by default when asked for the latest block. Under normal network conditions the safe head and the actual tip of the chain will be equivalent (with safe head trailing only by a few seconds). Safe heads will be less likely to be reorged than the current proof of work latest blocks. To expose the actual tip of the proof of stake chain, an unsafe flag will be added to JSON RPC.

Finalized blocks will also be exposed via JSON RPC, via a new finalized flag. These can then serve as a stronger substitute for proof of work confirmations. The table below summarizes this:

Block TypeConsensus MechanismJSON RPCConditions for reorg
headProof of WorklatestTo be expected, must be used with care.
headProof of StakeunsafeTo be expected, must be used with care.
safe headProof of StakelatestPossible, requires either large network delay or attack on network.
confirmedProof of WorkN/AUnlikely, requires a majority of hashrate to mine a competing chain of depth > # of confirmations.
finalizedProof of StakefinalizedExtremely unlikely, requires >2/3 of validators to finalize a competing chain requiring at least 1/3 to be slashed.

Next Steps

We hope this post helps application developers prepare for the much-anticipated transition to proof of stake. In the next few weeks, a long-lived testnet will be made available for testing by the broader community. There is also an upcoming Merge community call for infrastructure, tooling and application developers to ask questions and hear the latest technical updates about The Merge. See you there 👋🏻

Thank you to Mikhail Kalinin for providing the core content of the “Safe Head” section and to Danny Ryan & Matt Garnett for reviewing drafts of this post.

Source link

The Etherian Weekly Slack/Gitter Update: 3.12.2017-3.19.2017

Note From the Editor: WE NEED VOLUNTEERS!!! If you like this post, please come over to and cover a dapp.

Weekly Update 3.12.2017-3.19.2017

AKASHA – Social Media Network

  • Beware, someone is trying to impersonate Akasha – source.

AugurPrediction Market

Casper (Dev Channel) – Proof of Stake Protocol

ChronoBank – Labour Hour Stable Coins

Colony – Decentralized Collaboration Network

  • Beta still a few weeks away
  • “there will be a veritable torrent of information forthcoming in the next few months.” – @jack (Co-founder)

Digix – Asset (Gold) Backed Tokens

  • Blog Post: Digix Update — Mar 17th 2017
  • DGD carbon-vote to be held to determine what to do with DigixDao ETC.
  • Even more competition: OZcoinGold
    • Good graphic from rcmcnevin comparin the OZcoinGold and Digix Proof of Asset mechanisms.  (Updated graphic from KC Chng re: Digix)
    • KC Chng on competition: “Other companies that claim that they are “competing” in the same space do not even have a working testnet to test their code. So the hype of a competitor is unfounded at this point imho.”
  • Users cannot redeem DGX for gold bullion unless KYC’d.
  • “Just to add on the discussion for our paper, seems like a few people told me that it is too “simple”, and perhaps we should allow fundraising in eth, and suggested features etc. We *intentionally*  designed it to be simple. It should be seen from our Whitepaper which we hope is understandable even for people with minimum knowledge of Ethereum.”–Darvink

Ethlance – Decentralized freelancing platform with 0% fee

  • Ethlance is included in the newest Status release.
  • Ethlance tutorial videos.
  • Email notifications can now be controlled via preferences.
  • Dev update.

FirstBlood – Decentralized E-Sports Rewards Platform

  • Timeline in the whitepaper is no longer correct, the new one is yet to be determined.

GolemDistributed Computing Power

  • Julian – “we will be have updates for you soon”.
  • Still waiting for more candidates for the PR job 1 person has already been chosen but there could be more PR positions coming available.
  • Work is being done on the installers for Golem which is seen as key for its success.

ICONOMI – Digital Asset Management Platform

  • Users that applied for the beta testing program will be added first, then investors based on the ICO investment and then everybody else.
  • Phone Verification has been added to the beta version to prove you are “Human” and not spammer.
  • “Assets as of now will be stored in a 3 level cold storage and for sure won’t be kept at exchanges”.

Melon Port – “Blockchain Software for Asset Management”

  • Tokens are now transferable, user guide.
  • Token is tradable on Kraken.
  • Price feed module is live on the testnet.
  • Paid internship available to the right candidates.
  • Melon port Sponsored the Ethereum London Meetup.
  • Meetup planned for the 20th
  • Work underway to update documentation on wiki.

Status – Mobile Ethereum OS

Swarm – Serverless Hosting, Incentivised P2P Storage/Content Distribution

SingularDTV – Rights Management and Video On-Demand Portal

uPort – Self-Sovereign Identity

  • Testing progresses, lots of questions being answered regarding code but nothing new.

WeTrust – Trusted Lending Circles

  • Questions on whether early investors receive TRST proportional to subsequent rise in ETH price ala dividends. “As for dividends, we cannot issue them, however we will explore viability of other options such as burning certain amount of tokens that are received via fees. If you have suggestions, we’d love to hear your thoughts. Also feel free to email… We’re going to take some time and speak with our advisors and escrow partners to determine next steps. Again I hear where people are coming from and thank you for your support. Let us work out a solution that is fair.” – @george.wetrust
  • “We are consulting with our escrows and will have an answer by Monday. Thank you for the patience as we figure this out.” -@ron (CTO of WeTrust)
  • An Interview with Michael Casey, WeTrust Fintech Advisor
  • Blockchain Community comes together for WeTrust Charity Circle
  • Using the Lending Circle as a framework for buying shared resources and charity


    • Big thanks to Evan Van Ness for featuring us in his weekly post, please give him a subscription to his weekly email newsletter. His weekly post is the most in-depth and informative look into the ethereum ecosystem you’re going to get. Here’s a link to his site:
    • A nod of appreciation to @3esmit for putting so much work into our internal Etherian participation token.
    • Congratulations to u/ethermate for winning our logo competition!
    • Big thanks to Joe Urgo for featuring us in his daily post, The Dapp Daily. The Dapp Daily is your go-to daily summary of what’s happening in the ethereum ecosystem.
    • Check out ethercast for a full list of dapps –


    jarredchase__twitter: Swarm, Status, Colony, WeTrust, ChronoBank
    truewavebreak: ICONOMI, Golem, Augur, AKASHA, MelonPort
    MrNebbiolo: uPort, Casper, FirstBlood, Digix
    PΞther: Ethlance, SingularDTV

    Disclaimer: All information is taken from our volunteers at face value, if you have a complaint about one of our volunteers or one of our posts please contact and we will investigate the matter.

Source link

EtherDelta Founder Charged For Operating Unregistered Securities Exchange

EtherDelta Founder Charged For Operating Unregistered Securities Exchange

According to the press release published on November 8th, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has charged the founder of EtherDelta cryptocurrency exchange, Zachary Coburn, for operating an illegal securities exchange.

EtherDelta is one of the leading decentralized cryptocurrency exchange per daily volume and active users.

EtherDelta Founder Charged For Operating Unregistered Securities Exchange18 months of illegal practice

The SEC states that Coburn was, by not filing for the approval or asking for the exception from the ruling, violated a securities and exchange law in an 18-months long period of operation.

Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division Steven Peikin stated that securities market is going through a significant innovation period, as the distributed ledger technology is being implemented in the market’s products.

However positive that may be, he also stated that in order to protect investors from fraudulent conduct, the SEC has to practice a substantial amount of scrutiny and diligently enforce existing laws.

And according to those laws, some of the ERC-20 tokens traded on EtherDelta are described as securities, and as such, can be traded only on regulated exchange platforms.

Stephanie Avakian, Co-Director of the SEC’s Enforcement Division explained that Coburn’s exchange had all the functions and back end of an online national securities exchange, and was, therefore, obliged to be confirmed by the Commission.

SEC reported that EtherDelta processed around than 3.6 million orders after the Commission issued a 2017 DAO Report, by which DAO (Decentralized Autonomous Organization) tokens are considered to be securities. Since EtherDelta was offering these, the owner of the platform is being held responsible for the violation of the law.

Coburn cooperated but was still fined

Coburn has allegedly agreed to pay $300,000 as a repayment of ill-gotten gains, with the addition of $13,000 interest. The penalty of $75,000 was also issued for the founder of EtherDelta.

Coburn hasn’t denied nor confirmed these charges yet, but it was reported that he provided a full cooperation, which was taken into account when the fine was issued.

EtherDelta isn’t the first nor the last to be hit by SEC

Earlier this year, the SEC suspended all activity of the Nevada-based company American Retail Group, Inc. The company was given a cease and desist order by the Commission under the charges that they falsely claimed to be conducting a token offering officially registered and in legal accordance with the SEC.

Earlier this month, the Commission also reported that their thorough research of the market found dozens of startups conducting Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) which are not in accordance with the legal framework, and can thus be considered as fraudulent.

The SEC claims that these fundraising campaigns have already raised over $68 million from a wide range of investors.

It is yet unknown what measures is SEC going to take towards these startups, but it is highly unlikely that the usually strict Commission is going to let it slide.

The importance of clear regulations

The importance of regulations in the blockchain and cryptocurrency business is frequently emphasized as the cornerstone of any healthy market.

However, in the US, crypto-related business is being conducted in accordance with the old set of securities regulation, which may not be fit for new technologies.

EtherDelta’s case is, therefore, an interesting example as the SEC ruled Ether (ETH) not to be a security, and as such, doesn’t fall under the securities act.

Since EtherDelta was a trading platform for trading ERC-20 tokens exclusively, which are issued on the Ethereum network, it remains unknown which parameters the SEC has taken into account to deduce if an ERC-20 token is a security or not.

Just last week, reported that decentralized exchange IDEX had banned certain IP’s and will require its users to verify their identity.

Source link

Community Moderating — Bringing Our Best

In light of the Trump ban, far right hate speech, and the plainly weird QAnon conspiracy theories, the world’s attention is increasingly focused on the moderation of and by social media platforms.

Our work at AKASHA is founded on the belief that humans are not problems waiting to be solved, but potential waiting to unfold. We are dedicated to that unfolding, and so then to enabling, nurturing, exploring, learning, discussing, self-organizing, creating, and regenerating. And this post explores our thinking and doing when it comes to moderating.

Moderating processes are fascinating and essential. They must encourage and accommodate the complexity of community, and their design can contribute to phenomenal success or dismal failure. And regardless, we’re never going to go straight from zero to hero here. We need to work this up together.

We’re going to start by defining some common terms and dispelling some common myths. Then we explore some key design considerations and sketch out the feedback mechanisms involved, before presenting the moderating goals as we see them right now. Any and all comments and feedback are most welcome.

We will emphasise one thing about our Ethereum World journey — it makes no sense whatsoever for the AKASHA team to dictate the rules of the road, as we hope will become increasingly obvious in the weeks and months ahead.

Let’s do this.


“The beginning of wisdom is the definition of terms.” An apposite truism attributed to Socrates.

Governing — determining authority, decision-making, and accountability in the process of organizing [ref].

Moderating — the subset of governing that structures participation in a community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse [ref].

Censoring — prohibiting or suppressing information considered to be politically unacceptable, obscene, or a threat to security [Oxford English dictionary].

Myth 1: moderation is censorship

One person’s moderating is another person’s censoring, as this discussion among Reddit editors testifies. And while it’s been found that the centralized moderating undertaken by the likes of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube constitutes “a detailed system rooted in the American legal system with regularly revised rules, trained human decision-making, and reliance on a system of external influence”, it is clear “they have little direct accountability to their users” [ref].

That last bit doesn’t sit well with us, and if you’re reading this then it very likely doesn’t float your boat either. We haven’t had to rely on private corporations taking this role throughout history, and we have no intention of relying on them going forward.

Subjectively, moderation may feel like censorship. This could be when the moderator really has gone ‘too far’, or when the subject doesn’t feel sufficiently empowered to defend herself, but also when the subject is indeed just an asshole.
Free Speech on

As you will imagine, AKASHA is not pro-censorship. Rather, we recognise that the corollary of freedom of speech is freedom of attention. Just because I’m writing something does not mean you have to read it. Just because I keep writing stuff doesn’t mean you have to keep seeing that I keep writing stuff. This is a really important observation.

Myth 2: moderation is unnecessary

AKASHA is driven to help create the conditions for the emergence of collective minds i.e. intelligences greater than the sum of their parts. Anyone drawn to AKASHA, and indeed to Ethereum, is interested in helping to achieve something bigger than themselves, and we haven’t found an online ‘free-for-all’ that leads to such an outcome.

Large scale social networks without appropriate moderating actions are designed to host extremists, or attract extremists because the host has given up trying to design for moderating. A community without moderating processes is missing essential structure, leaving it little more than a degenerative mess that many would avoid.

Myth 3: moderation is done by moderators

Many social networks and discussion fora include a role often referred to as moderator, but every member of every community has some moderating capabilities. This may be explicit — e.g. flagging content for review by a moderator — or implicit — e.g. heading off a flame war with calming words.

If a community member is active, she is moderating. In other words, she is helping to maintain and evolve the social norms governing participation. As a general rule of thumb, the more we can empower participants to offer appropriate positive and negative feedback, the more appropriately we can divine an aggregate consequence, the more shoulders take up the essential moderating effort. We’ll know when we’ve got there when the role we call moderator seems irrelevant.

Myth 4: moderation is simple enough

Moderating actions may be simple enough, but overall moderating design is as much art as science. It’s top-down, bottom-up, and side-to-side, and complex …

Complexity refers to the phenomena whereby a system can exhibit characteristics that can’t be traced to one or two individual participants. Complex systems contain a collection of many interacting objects. They involve the effect of feedback on behaviors, system openness, and the complicated mixing of order and chaos [ref]. Many interacting people constitute a complex system, so there’s no getting around this in the context of Ethereum World.

The law of requisite variety asserts that a system’s control mechanism (i.e. the governing, specifically the moderating in the context here) must be capable of exhibiting more states than the system itself [ref]. Failure to engineer for this sets the system up to fail. Here are some example failure modes in this respect:

  • A team of central moderators that just can’t keep up with the volume of interactions requiring their attention
  • The value of engaging in moderating processes is considered insufficient
  • Moderating processes are perceived as unfair
  • Those doing the moderating cannot relate to the context in question
  • Moderating processes are too binary (e.g. expulsion is the only punishment available).

Let’s take a look at some of the things we need to take into consideration, various feedback loops, and our moderating goals.


There are a number of top-level design considerations [ref]. These include:

Manual / automatic

Human interactions involve subtlety, context, irony, sarcasm, and multimedia; in fact many qualities and formats that don’t come easy to algorithmic interpretation. Fully automated moderation isn’t feasible today (and perhaps we might hope that long remains the case), so that leaves us with entirely manual moderating processes and computer-assisted moderating processes.

Transparent / opaque

“Your account has been disabled.”

This is all you get when Facebook’s automated moderation kicks in. No explanation. No transparency. At AKASHA, we default to transparency, obvs.
Facebook notice of disabled account, as of 2020

Deterrence & punishment

Only when people know about a law can it be effective. Only when people learn of a social norm can it endure. Both the law and social norms deter but do not prevent subversion. Punishment is available when the deterrent is insufficient — in fact it validates the deterrent — and both are needed in moderating processes.

Centralized / decentralized

Decentralization is a means rather than an end of itself [ref]. In this instance, decentralized moderating processes contribute to a feeling of community ‘ownership’, personal agency, and ideally more organic scaling.

Extrinsic / intrinsic motivation

Some moderating processes play out in everyday interactions whereas others require dedication of time to the task. That time allocation is either extrinsically motivated (e.g. for payment, per Facebook’s moderators), or intrinsically motivated (e.g. for the cause, per the Wikipedia community). It is often said that the two don’t make comfortable bedfellows, but at the same time there are many people out there drawn to working for ‘a good cause’ and earning a living from it.

We are drawn to supporting and amplifying intrinsic motivations without making onerous demands on the time of a handful of community members. Moderating processes should feel as normal as not dropping litter and occasionally picking up someone else’s discarded Coke can. When they start to feel more like a volunteer litter pick then questions of ‘doing your fair share’ are raised in the context of a potential tragedy of the commons.

Never-ending feedback

Nothing about moderating is ever static. We can consider five levels of feedback:

1st loop

Demonstrating and observing behaviors on a day-to-day basis is a primary source and sustainer of a community’s culture — how we do and don’t do things around here. We might call it moderating by example.

2nd loop

This is more explicitly about influencing the circulation of content and the form most people think about when contemplating moderation. A typical form of second-loop feedback is exemplified by the content that has accrued sufficient flags to warrant attention by a moderator — someone with authority to wield a wider range of moderating processes and/or greater powers in wielding them. While it sometimes appears to play second fiddle to corrective feedback, 2nd loop also includes positive feedback celebrating contributions and actions the community would love to see more of.

3rd loop

Community participation is structured by moderating processes. Third-loop feedback may then operate to review and trim or adapt or extend those structures, reviewing members’ agency, by regular appointment or by exception.

4th loop

Moderating is a form of governing — the processes of determining authority, decision-making, and accountability. Fourth-loop feedback may then operate such that the outcomes of 1st-, 2nd-, and 3rd-loop feedback prompt a review of community governance, or contribute to periodic reviews.

When infrastructure is owned and/or operated by a legal entity, that entity has legal responsibilities under relevant jurisdictions that may require the removal of some content. When content-addressable storage is used (e.g. IPFS, Swarm), deletion is tricky but delisting remains quite feasible when discovery entails the maintenance of a search index.

Moderating design goals

We’ve identified eight moderating design goals. It will always be useful in our future discussions together to identify whether any difference of opinion relates to the validity of a goal or to the manner of achieving it.

Goal 1: Freedom

We celebrate freedom of speech and freedom of attention, equally.

Goal 2: Inclusivity

Moderating actions must be available to all. Period.

Everyone is welcome to edit Wikipedia

Goal 3: Robustness

Moderating actions by different members may accrue different weights in different contexts solely to negate manipulation / gaming and help sustain network health. In simple terms, ‘old hands’ may be more fluent in moderating actions than newbies, and we also want to amplify humans and diminish nefarious bots in this regard.

Goal 4: Simplicity

Moderating processes should be simple, non-universal (excepting actions required for legal compliance), and distributed.

Goal 5: Complexity

The members and moderating processes involved should produce requisite complexity.

Goal 6: Levelling up

We want to encourage productive levelling up and work against toxic levelling down, for network health in the pursuit of collective intelligence.

Goal 7: Responsibility

Moderating processes should help convey that with rights (e.g. freedom from the crèches of centralized social networks) come responsibilities.

Goal 8: Decentralized

Moderating processes should be straightforward to architect in web 2 initially, and not obviously impossible in the web 3 stack in the longer-term. If we get it right, a visualisation of appropriate network analysis should produce something like the image in the centre here:

Moderating consequences — gotta get us some dynamic polycentricity

This list is by no means exhaustive or final. The conversation about moderation continues, but it needs you! If you think you’d like to be a bigger part of this in the early stages, please get in touch with us. If you feel it is missing something, we also encourage you to join the conversation here and here.

Featured photo credits: Courtney Williams on Unsplash

Source link

Why This Crypto Billionaire Abandoned Ethereum

Ethereum which is the second-largest cryptocurrency project in the globe has enjoyed the support of major and big-time investors in recent years. Its growth over the last year has helped to further reinforce why investors tend to choose the altcoin over Bitcoin. One of those who have supported Ethereum openly and majorly in the past has been Su Zhu, CEO, and CIO of Three Arrows Capital, a Singapore-based fund management firm.

Zhu who has supported Ethereum for a while recently announced that he was leaving the digital asset behind. This came as a shock but Zhu’s reasons for making this move have proven to have some merit to it and has got some in the space wondering about the future of the blockchain.

Related Reading | Famed Psychologist Jordan Peterson Says “Inflation Be Damned” As He Buys More Bitcoin

Zhu Exits Ethereum

In a series of tweets posted to Twitter, the CEO outlined his reasons for exiting the second-largest cryptocurrency in the market. According to Zhu, the barriers to entry for Ethereum had become too high for it to be a feasible investment for newcomers. He explained that just as he has abandoned the project, so has the project abandoned its users.

Related Reading | Kraken Is Delisting Top Privacy Coin Monero (XMR) For UK Users

Zhu explained that Ethereum had gotten too big to care for what the blockchain had set out to do in the beginning, implying that the project had lost its way. He had then suggested that it needed a reminder in the way of a bear market to set it back on track again. On the flip side of that, the CEO had also suggested that maybe migrating to a new blockchain may be the next best thing.

Going further, Zhu had addressed the negative feedback that his initial tweets had gotten from the Ethereum community. He pointed to the exorbitantly high fees that are now required to transact on the Ethereum network, stating that “users are livid that they’re promised a vision of the future, then told that they have to pay $100-1k per tx to enjoy it, and then get told some tales about how they should’ve been smart enough to buy ETH at $10.”

Looking Forward To A New Blockchain

Zhu’s tweets come after his fund management firm, Three Arrows Capital, had been disclosed to be invested in Ethereum’s rival blockchain, Avalanche. It was revealed that the firm had been a contributor of Blizzard, which finances developers that are building on the Avalanche blockchain. Blizzard hosts a $200 million fund that is specifically targeted for this purpose.

Ethereum price chart from

ETH trending at $4,151 | Source: ETHUSD on

In addition, a wallet that was said to be attached to Three Arrows Capital had moved a significant amount of Ethereum to the FTX crypto exchange. It is speculated that the approximately $77 million worth of ETH had been moved to the platform to be sold.

Featured image from Analytics Insight, chart from

Source link